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Interpretation in Dance Performing1 
 
 
Most aesthetics philosophers in the analytic tradition discuss interpretation 
from what will here be called the critical-philosophical perspective – they 
consider interpretation of art as part of the function of an evaluating 
appreciator who is seeking to both identify and to understand a static art 
object, such as a painting, sculpture, text, or structure, whether real or 
abstract. This essay, however, is on the role and function of the dance 
performer, the person who is dancing in a kind of dance-as-art event that is 
designed for and performed for an audience that perceives, witnesses, 
experiences, and appreciates the dance in various ways. As such this chapter 
focuses on a component of dance practice that diverges from critical-
philosophical practice in two ways: 1) it is from the point of view of an 
embodied person engaged in a dynamic process, and 2) the dance as art on 
which this perspective focuses is itself treated as a process or event that need 
is neither static nor necessarily enduring – it could be ephemeral in the sense 
that it may not have identical features from performance to performance. My 
particular focus within this framework will be to consider to what extent is 
the dance performer an interpreter, and if she is an interpreter, in what 
sense, and what does she interpret? This paper thus seeks to better 
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understand the nature of dance performance in practice by analyzing the role 
of the dance performer’s contribution in light of any interpretive function she 
might have. 
To begin, I will survey some leading theories on the interpretation of 
art, from Susan Sontag, Arthur Danto, and Joseph Margolis, and from there 
construct a working and open definition of interpretation in art that can be 
applied to dance-as-art, by which I means the kind of concert dance that is 
offered for experience, appreciation, and understanding as art. From there 
this definition will be used to identify two dance-performance-related 
practices that I think do count as interpretation in this sense, and I will 
demonstrate how the dance performer might meet these conditions. Finally, I 
will consider briefly, and as a promissory note for a more all-encompassing 
theory of the dancer’s role in dance performance, what the dance performer 
might be doing that is not best understood as interpretation. 
In her famous 1961 essay, ‘Against Interpretation’, Susan Sontag says: 
…I don’t mean interpretation in the broadest sense, the sense 
in which Nietzsche (rightly) says, “There are no facts, only 
interpretations”. By interpretation, I mean a conscious act of 
the mind which illustrates a certain code, certain “rules” of 
interpretation. 
    Directed to art, interpretation means plucking a set of 
elements (the X, the Y, the Z, and so forth) from the whole 
work. The task of interpretation is virtually one of translation. 
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The interpreter says, Look, don’t you see that X is really—or, 
really means—A? That Y is really B? That Z is really C? (S. 
Sontag 1961, p. 5). 
According to Sontag, this is classical interpretation, and it re-writes and 
alters the artwork, even though the interpreter claims to be identifying the 
work’s true meaning.  She says that the modern style of interpretation is even 
worse because it “excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it digs ‘behind’ the 
text, to find a sub-text which is the true one” (S. Sontag 1961, p. 6). She then 
uses Marxist and Freudian analyses as examples of this kind of destructive 
interpretation. 
Sontag believes that one ought to be sensitive to one’s response to art 
(the paradigm example for her is literary art, a static art form) and to be alive 
to it in all the ways that it is there to be responded to without doing violence 
to the artwork by finding or inventing meanings for the work that are not 
available in the experience of the work (see Sontag 1961, pp. 9-10). Thus she 
prefers what she calls a “formalist” theory of interpretation above a “content-
based” one in which the interpreter hunts for the true meaning behind what 
is actually there (Sontag 1961, pp. 12-14). Further, Sontag doesn’t think that 
the artist’s intention that their work be either interpreted or not matters 
because she thinks that artists are sometimes guilty of seeing their own work 
through a work-altering interpretive lens (Sontag 1961, p. 9).  
In his essay, ‘Deep Interpretation’, Arthur Danto notes that 
responding to a work via sensory experience or passions alone (a theory he 
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attributes to Schopenhauer) offers no way to understand the sort of 
conceptual art in which the artwork is perceptually indiscernible from its 
material counterpart (Danto 2005, pp. 37-39). Here Danto’s paradigm 
artwork is a painting or sculpture. He thinks this kind of perception is 
biologically basic and does not include enhancement by cultural resources. In 
addition, Danto interprets Sontag’s criticism of interpretation as not being 
against interpretation altogether but against the kind of interpretation that 
overdetermines the work of art. He does not think, for example, that she 
would be against the sort of interpretation that he calls surface interpretation 
– that just consists of identifying the text as the work of art it claims to be in 
historical context along with some surrounding identifications that are 
roughly in line with some basic and apparent artistic purposes (such as the 
title of the piece for example). He that thinks what Sontag objects to is deep 
interpretation – which he says involves a kledon, a Greek term for the 
situation where “a speaker makes utterances ‘that are more than the speaker 
realizes’…” (Danto 2005, p. 54). Here an artist or author is in no better 
position than anyone else to say what the artwork means, since meanings are 
abstracted that may not have even been available to the author (see Danto 
2005, p. 51). An example of this would be to say that artwork X represents 
Freud’s view of sexual repression when that theory did not exist when the 
artwork was created.  
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Danto agrees with Sontag that deep interpretation can “over-
determine” the work (Danto 2005, p. 66).  And yet, in his essay, ‘The 
Appreciation and Interpretation of Works of Art’, he says the following: 
My view, historically, is that interpretations are discovered and 
that interpretive statements are true or false. My view, 
philosophically, is that interpretations constitute works of art 
[as works of art], so that you do not, as it were, have the 
artwork on one side and the interpretation on the other. 
(Danto 2005, p. 23, bracketed material mine).  
Thus, it seems that Danto holds both that interpretive statements about an 
artwork are true or false, and that it is the process of interpretation itself that 
determines an artwork’s meaning as a work of art – it constitutes it. Here he 
says, “Interpretation is in effect the level with which an object is lifted out of 
the real world and into the artworld, where it becomes vested in often 
unexpected raiment” (Danto 2005, p. 39). We know from his “artworld” 
paper and from his subsequent work following it that Danto’s view is that the 
person qualified to make this interpretation is an expert in the artworld to 
which the work of art belongs (Danto 1964 and Danto 1981). But this 
“unexpected raiment” calls to mind the children’s story, ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes’, where it takes a child to point out that all the adults are claiming to 
see something that simply isn’t there. 
Joseph Margolis identifies two modes of interpretation for artworks: 
1) interpretation for purposes of historical identification, and 2) 
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interpretation that counts as part of understanding the nature of a particular 
work of art. In short, Margolis acknowledges that one has to treat an artwork 
as stable for purposes of historical identification but he does not believe that 
this means that the meaning of that artwork is ever singular or determinate, 
and therefore it cannot lend itself to one true interpretation (Margolis 2001, 
pp. 105-106). Instead, Margolis has a pluralist and relativist view of artwork 
interpretation, one in which changes in culture can create multiple “truth-
like” interpretations of any given artwork at various points of time due to the 
artwork’s nature as an evolving cultural artifact that has meanings that 
change due to changes in culture (Margolis 2001, p. 127; 1995, p. 28; and 
1999, pp. 84-85). Margolis uses the term “Intentional properties”, with an 
upper-case “I”, to refer to those features of artworks that are put into an 
artwork by an artist and that have semiotic meaning to both the artist and to 
his interpreting culture (Margolis 1999, pp. 60-62, and p. 73). On Margolis’ 
view, for example, it would be “truth-like” to say that a painting depicting 
Christ was depicting both the sense of who Christ was that existed at the time 
and place of the artwork’s creation and the person who Christ was as 
understood by historically later or different cultural interpretations of Christ. 
He calls this sort of interpretation “truth-like” rather than true because he 
does not think that artworks as cultural artifacts have discoverable 
properties that can have true interpretations that last for all time and that 
are not true-for-x, with x being the interpreting culture. Thus, an artist on 
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Margolis’ view does not have full control over the meaning of the work that 
he creates.  
To sum up, on Margolis’ view an artwork’s meaning lies in its 
properties or features that are perceivable in the artwork by an interpreting 
culture. Margolis’ theory too, primarily focuses on literary texts, paintings, 
and sculptures, although Margolis also holds that intentional properties exist 
in music, dance, and in all other art forms and activities that he construes as 
lingual utterances. Since this perception varies by culture it is not tied to 
human biology alone, such as in the limited sort of biological sensory 
experience that Danto attributes to Schopenhauer. Indeed, for Margolis 
perception of an artwork would accommodate conceptual art by 
apprehending its meaning through whatever clues are available to aid that 
comprehension that are given to them by the artist – such as the artwork’s 
title or other direction for viewing the piece provided by the artist. For 
example, if one can see that a poem is a haiku, one could at least make use of 
any culturally-available interpretive practices for haikus. It might be a haiku 
even if the artist didn’t intend that to be the case – if it happened to be in 
haiku form in a coincidental way. Sontag would probably say that it would be 
wrong for a Margolian interpreter to call the poem a haiku but not wrong to 
point out the perceptual, formal features of that haiku. And Danto would 
probably say its haiku-ness was true under a philosophical (deep) but not 
historical (surface) interpretation. 
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In light these views on artwork interpretation I will now construct an 
open and working definition of interpretation to use in connection with 
dance performing that shares some continuity with the standard theories of 
artwork interpretation mentioned earlier. This has the advantage of not 
departing too greatly from how interpretation in art is known and 
understood in Western cultural scholarship, although as we shall see the fact 
that dance involves a moving, thinking, embodied dancer may change the 
suitability of a theory of interpretation culled from those that have primarily 
static art forms in mind. Bracketing for now – we will return to this later – 
the question of what qualifies as interpretanda (by which is meant properly 
interpretable material) for the performer’s interpretation in dance 
performance this paper holds that interpretation in art is at least (but not 
only) this:  
• The process by which an interpreter evaluates and uses customary 
artworld interpretanda in order to identify the meaning of the art 
product at issue. 
This is a view of interpretation of art that gives credence to Danto’s view of 
artworld expertise. For dance purposes the relevant artworld would be the 
danceworld, in which expert interpretative ability would acknowledged in 
qualified dance critics as well as in other kinds of danceworld scholars. The 
“art product at issue” refers to the dance performance. The term “art 
product” is used instead of “artwork” in order to escape any explicit or 
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implied commitment to an ontological view that holds that a dance artwork 
must be a textual or abstract structure.  
This working definition (by which I mean that it is provisional only) is 
broad enough to accommodate all three of the views on interpretation in art 
mentioned earlier. Formalist, surface, deep, and culturally relative and 
pluralistic interpretations of art are all customary kinds of interpretation in 
art, including dance. This definition is also an open one so that it can allow 
for newly emergent interpretive practices to develop out of or in reaction to 
customary ones.  
We turn now to a discussion of what kinds of interpretive activities 
and roles exist in the practices of creating and performing dance in order to 
identify what, precisely, the performing dancer might do that is in line with 
the working definition of interpretation now provided.  
This section will evaluate two activities a dancer may engage in 
during preparation for dance performance. They are as follows:  
1) Evaluation and use of any pre-existing choreographic notes or 
directions (which may not rise to the level of a notated “score” in the 
technical sense); and 
2) Evaluation and use of any notes or guidelines from a director (the 
director may or may not also be the choreographer). 
1) is a situation in which the dance performer independently evaluates any 
pre-existing choreographic notes or directions. She analyzes the detailed 
libretto and notes on verbal indicators from Jean Coralli and Jules Perrot’s 
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original choreography for Giselle, for example, which took place in Paris in 
1841, in preparation for performing the title role.  
In 2), interpretation of any notes or guidelines from a director, let us 
imagine the case where the dance performer does not use any independent 
interpretation of original choreographic guidelines for Giselle, or that if she 
does so it is only with the express or tacit approval of the performance 
director. This situation is one where:  
1) The structure and format of the dance performances is created by the 
performance director, who may or may not be the choreographer (he 
may, for example, be either restaging the Coralli and Perrot 
choreography or, like Marius Petipa did for The Imperial Ballet of 
Russia, he may provide new choreography for Giselle altogether); 
2) The plan or framework for the dance performance is set in advance by 
the director. Here there is a continuum between dances where: 
a. The dance has fully set directions, where all or nearly all of the 
steps and stylistic and expressive nuances are determined 
ahead of time and executed as closely as possible; and 
b. Some themes or ideas for where to begin are available to the 
dance performer but the rest of the dance performance 
features are left up to the discretion or improvisation. 
Now let us apply the working definition of interpretation provided earlier. 
That definition, remember, was the following. Interpretation in art is:  
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• The process by which an interpreter evaluates and uses customary 
artworld interpretanda in order to identify the meaning of the art 
product at issue. 
Applying this definition to interpretation by the dance performer, and 
inserting the kind of dance performer roles provided above, we get this: 
• The process by which the dancer [interpreter] evaluates and uses a pre-
existing score or plan from a choreographer and/or director [both 
customary interpretanda in danceworld practice] in order to identify 
the meaning of the dance performance.  
In practice, dance performers do sometimes directly interpret pre-existing 
scores or choreographic plans. Dance anthropologist Anya Peterson Royce, 
for example, points out that ballet dancers at the Kirov school were trained in 
acting so that they could interpret roles directly from texts or choreographic 
plans without necessarily relying on directions from directors (Royce 1984, 
p. 127).  
In addition, dancers do often follow director’s plans rather than the 
original choreographers’. This is true in the case, for example, where a 
director restages a dance for contemporary audiences, as has been seen in 
many different versions of Swan Lake and The Nutcracker, with the new 
versions identified with the new choreographer’s name in most cases (for 
example, Mats Eks’ Swan Lake, or Akram Khan’s Giselle).  
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If we think that dance performers are interpreters in these ways then 
the performance an audience sees has already been through one interpretive 
process before they get to interpret it. But IS this what’s going on? 
Graham McFee holds that one broad usage of the term “interpretation” in the 
performing arts refers to the performer’s interpretation of the piece 
performed, such as in Pollini’s interpretation of Schoenberg’s Six Little Piano 
Pieces Opus 19 or in Nureyev’s interpretation of Sleeping Beauty (McFee 
1992, p. 100 and p. 103). “Here”, McFee says, “the interpretation typically 
consists in some set of actions performed, or, as we might way, in producing 
that object in which the witnessable work consists” (McFee 1992, p. 100). In 
both music and dance McFee thinks that the job of the performer is to 
perform the work of art, which for McFee, is the abstract structure as 
evidenced by an at-least-in-principle notation (McFee 2011, 168-171). He 
acknowledges that different performer’s interpretations can bring out or 
highlight different features of the underlying work, and that by doing so they 
can create a distinctive performance and even contribute to the properties of 
performances, via what he calls their “craft-mastery” (McFee 1992, p. 123; 
2013, p. 29 and p. 35; see also 2011, p. 155). But McFee also thinks that 
constraints on the role of the performer are “actually provided either by the 
notation or some notation-equivalent,” clarifying later that the object for 
interpretation is the structure but that the notation makes this explicit and 
that the constraints on performance will change “as notation systems change 
or different ones are employed” (McFee 1992, 102, 104, and 106). He 
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categorically denies that this “interpretation” is creative in any way, and this 
means that the dance performer is not an artist and not someone who can be 
credited with co-authorship of dances (McFee 1992, 104; 2011, 168-173; 
2013, p. 29).  McFee also says that “the performer’s interpretation does not 
really constitute a level of interpretation at all” (by which he presumably 
means critical interpretation in a formal sense) because he sees the 
performer as just the necessary vehicle for making the dance work of art 
available for criticism (McFee 1992, p. 124). The choreographer creates the 
dance structure, the dance performer makes it visible to a critic, and the 
critic determines its meaning (McFee 1992, pp. 152-154).  
McFee holds further that if the dance performer does more than just provide 
notation-acceptable embellishments on the abstract structure, then this is “a 
case where a new work of art is brought into being...” (McFee 1992, 108). 
According to McFee, this can happen in the case of a virtuoso performance 
that McFee says is a “poor performance” when it distracts the spectator from 
the structure of the dance (McFee 2011, p. 180). Or it can be a case where 
improvisational activity by the dance performer does not fall within the 
acceptable structure of the work. This creates a new performable (and 
ostensibly re-performable) work of art (McFee 2011, p. 156 and p. 163). 
McFee denies that “a one-off work with a performing character” is a work of 
art – calling it instead a “happening” (McFee 2011, p. 156 and pp. 160-161; 
2013, footnote 2; c.f. Davies 2011, pp. 143-148). 
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If McFee thinks that dance performers can create new artworks 
through embellishments or other improvisational activity, then it is hard to 
see how he can simultaneously claim that they are not creative or artists. 
Presumably McFee would answer that they are not artists when they stick to 
their role of performing, which he limits to instantiating the structure. Doing 
more than this turns performers into composers or choreographers of a new 
work of art. (McFee gives no guidance, however, on how we are to view that 
new work of art as a work of art, or identify it as that new work going 
forward.)  
One difficulty here, as noted, is that dancers don’t always plan their 
performances ahead of time. But even when they do it’s not clear that they do 
so with either the original choreographer or a subsequent choreographer’s 
or director’s plan in mind. Ruth Eshel, a dance philosopher, choreographer, 
and dance critic, says that the process of performing includes working out 
both the technical and artistic aspects of a role in a two-part process: 
The first is a systematic, logical and cognitive grappling with 
the challenges that the steps pose. The second an individual 
artistic interpretation of the part, stemming from the private 
world of imagination, emotion, energy and associations of the 
individual artist. (Eshel 1995, p. 87). 
If imagination and associations of the individual artist are involved, and if it 
comes from a private world, it’s not clear to what extent this complies with 
McFee’s view of performing as instantiating a structure.  
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Let us consider, now, the possibility that there are other sorts of things that 
the dance performer is doing that falls outside of making the dance visible to 
the critics. Some dance theorists hold, as I do, that dance performers are 
often creative, are often artists accordingly, and as such are often co-authors 
of dances, rather than merely “craft-masters” (cf. McFee 2011, p. 181 and p. 
184, and 2013, p. 28). New York Times dance critic Anna Kisselgoff has noted 
that 19th-century ballet was designed around the personalities of its lead 
dancers. She does say that in contemporary dance roles are more important 
than the performers in it, that performers are “instruments” of 
choreographers, but she also notes that “unless the dancer ‘performs’ rather 
than merely executes the steps, the choreography will fail” (Kisselgoff 1978, 
p. D17). Kisselgoff also says that in the case of Balanchine ballet, the work of 
the dance performer, such as adding stylistic nuances “does require its own 
kind of artistry” (Kisselgoff 1978, p. D17). Dance scholar and choreography 
professor Larry Lavender also points out that “even in cases in which an 
artist has a specific meaning or message in mind [he thinks that in many 
cases they do not], a work of art, as it takes shape, tends to take on a life and 
character of its own as the artist engages with his or her materials … be they 
colors, musical tones, words, or movements” (Lavender 1995, p. 27, 
bracketed material mine). Choreographers often use the dancers’ created 
movements, steps or stylistic nuances as part of the building blocks for what 
will be the eventual dance, in many cases making dancers’ contributions 
highly visible, rather than “relatively invisible”, as McFee says that they are 
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(McFee 2011, p. 180). Shirley McKechnie and Catherine Stevens point out, for 
example, that dancers and choreographers in contemporary dance often 
improvise together in order to create and select the materials out of which a 
dance is formed (McKechnie and Stevens 2009, p. 40). Further, they note that 
such dance ensemble collaborations can create what they call “evolving 
dynamical systems” and that it is these that often result in a self-organizing 
form of a dance (McKechnie and Stevens 2009, pp. 41-43). The ensemble as a 
unit, rather than any individual within it, is therefore the true author of the 
dance.  
There is also evidence to show that most performances are not 
constrained by notations, even notations-in-principle. The one exception is 
the performances for which a choice has been made to be historically faithful 
to a given structure but this situation happens in just a fraction of actual 
cases. McFee does acknowledge the weakness of notation in dance practice 
but then suggests that this shows a weakness in the notational systems 
themselves rather than a weakness in a philosophic system that construes 
the abstract structure, as evidenced by notation, as the only possible 
candidate for evaluation of dance-as-art (see McFee 2013, pp. 35-41). 
Perhaps one reason why better notation has not been created is because 
there is a critical mass of dance choreographers and performers who do not 
recognize the need or value of such a notation; indeed, they have been 
getting along just fine without it. Indeed, any pre-existent elements that 
might be used as the springboard for a dance is more commonly 
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communicated through “multimodal recording and archives of dance works” 
and via the dancers’ bodies, which are themselves “repositories of the dance 
works that they have composed and/or performed” (McKechnie and Stevens 
2009, p. 45; see also Eshel 1995, particularly at 84, for examples of dancers 
who use other dancers’ performances, including stylistic and other 
performer-contributed elements, rather than the structures of scores 
whether real or in principle, as the model for their performances). 
Another consideration is that sometimes dance performers do not always 
fully cognize or understand how they will perform a role ahead of time, as in 
the case of many of the dancers who were trained in the neo-classical style of 
New York City Ballet director, choreographer, and teacher George 
Balanchine. Dance anthropologist and comparative literature scholar Anya 
Peterson Royce, in her book Movement and Meaning: Creativity and 
Interpretation in Ballet and Mime, points to dance critic Arlene Croce’s 
observation (substantiated in the autobiographies of Suzanne Farrell, Merrill 
Ashley, Edward Villella and others) that Balanchine often encouraged both 
individual style in his dancers and gave them the room to spontaneously add 
their own stylistic flourishes during performance (Royce 1984, p. 121, citing 
Croce 1979; see also Eshel 1995, p. 86, and Kisselgoff, 1978, D17, for more on 
this). Royce refers to this as “spontaneous in-the-performance 
interpretation” (Royce 1984, p. 121).  
Our working definition of interpretation, however, includes the 
phrase “…in order to identify the meaning of the performance” which is there 
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to capture the sense from the art interpretation theorists earlier that 
interpretation is about identification of meaning. Thus, on the traditional 
accounts of interpretation of art canvassed earlier the interpreter can say to 
herself or to someone else, “The meaning of X is Y”. But is a Balanchine 
dancer doing that? Is she providing an account of the meaning of X and 
saying, through their dancing, that it is Y? This marks one of the difficulties of 
treating interpretation in dance performing as an extension of critical 
interpretation.  
Perhaps what would help here is an account of meaning identification 
in which meaning is intuited, identified and conveyed in bodily and felt 
rather than in consciously decided ways. One where the “thinking” involved 
is embodied and not necessarily the kind of meaning that can be put into 
words. To capture the moving-while-doing aspect of dance performing we’d 
also need a kind of thinking that is live and online rather than reflective and 
contemplative. This chapter cannot, for space and time reasons, make and 
defend adequately the case for such an expanded view of the thinking-while-
doing nature of a dancer’s agency, although I have done so elsewhere (see 
Bresnahan 2014).  Suffice it to say now that if the term understanding were 
expanded in such a way then we might call performing Balanchine ballet 
interpretation. 
We have now come to a crossroads where a decision must be made as to 
whether to push this line of thinking and so subsume the Balanchine neo-classical 
process described above under the term interpretation. What might be the costs 
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and benefits of calling this “interpretation”? On the benefit side would be that 
dancers are credited with understanding what they are doing and are not treated as 
merely non-thinking puppets. This seems dancer-friendly and gives credit to the 
difficulties of dance performance that are minded and not mechanical. Another 
point on the benefit side is that this sort of activity is commonly referred to as 
“interpretation” in dance practice and it’s helpful for interdisciplinary work when 
terms are kept constant between disciplines. (For usage of the term 
“interpretation” in this way see Acocella 2005 and Barnes 1975).  On the cost 
side is that an embodied thinking-while-doing process that dance performers are 
involved in gets subsumed (and possibly lost) under the term “interpretation” 
when it may in fact be the case that it is a separate process worthy of exploration 
and consideration.  
Suppose now that a significant part of what a dancer does in 
performance is not the conveying of understanding after an interpretive 
effort, but a performance that is just the output of how the dancer finds 
herself moving through it. What if the dancer is merely adding her own 
artistically trained and natural instinctual and embodied sense of how to 
move within any frameworks provided for the piece? And what if this is a 
vital, ineliminable, and non-contingent aspect of dance performance, without 
which its full meaning cannot be identified or understood by an audience? 
If what we think that what matters most to understanding the nature of 
dance is the pre-existing plan or structure then it makes sense to hold, as 
McFee does, that if the dancer adds too much of their own contribution then 
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they are performing the given structure poorly and creating a new structure. 
Indeed, viewed in this way then the dance performer would be guilty of the 
kind of altering interpretation that Sontag decries, that Danto calls the sort of 
“deep interpretation” that overdetermines the artwork, and that Margolis 
might say either does or does not go beyond the meaning that is 
understandable to the audience as the interpreting culture. If we think, 
however, that what matters most in many cases is the dancers’ contribution 
to a distinctive artistic experience for the audience, then we would be better 
off viewing the dancer in these cases as a co-author and co-creative artist 
rather than either a poor interpreter or someone who has hijacked one dance 
in order to turn it into another. Sondra Fraleigh, for example, describes dance 
as “a special case of voluntary motion, imbued with the aesthetic intentions 
of performers and the larger intentionality (purposes) of each particular 
dance” (Fraleigh 1999, p. 196). Fraleigh thus treats the voluntary motion and 
aesthetic intentions of the dancers together with “the larger intentionality of 
the dance”, which she has specifically not reduced to pre-existing intentions 
or structures of a choreographer or director. Further, dance performance 
styles are often so unique and individual that they cannot be copied by other 
dancers, even when they try their best to do so. Dancer and teacher Maria 
Fay attributes this individuality to “a particular dancer’s individual approach, 
charisma, physique and talent” (Fay 1996). She cites an example of a highly 
trained ballet dancer who tried to copy another performer’s style but who 
was able to copy only the images created by the other dancer but not her 
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movement personality. In addition, some particular dances have hinged 
heavily on a particular individual dance performer or set of performers. 
Dancer, director, and choreographer Robert Helpmann, for example, has 
noted that some of Frederick Ashton’s ballets were so influenced by 
particular dancers that the ballets would lose something if the dancer left 
(see Royce 1984, pp. 124-125, quoting Helpmann 1971, p. 96). Dance critic 
Marcia Siegel has also observed that the continuous adagio in Twyla Tharp’s 
As Time Goes By was “an achievement due in large part to Larry Grenier, who 
created the role…”, adding that “Grenier was indulgent in space, letting his 
motion slide easily into its own fluctuating rhythms” (Krasnow 1994, pp. 17-
18, quoting Siegel 1979, pp. 356-357). And there are many other examples of 
this phenomenon – one need only to think of any outstanding singular 
dancers who made singular contributions to the roles they initiated (such as 
Nijinsky in La Spectre de la Rose, Judith Jamison in “Cry” from Alvin Ailey’s 
Revelations, or Martha Graham as Medea for starters).  
What all this means is that the term interpretation as used in 
traditional aesthetics philosophy with paradigm instances of art objects that 
were static, non-moving, and non-embodied in a human performer – 
painting, sculpture, literary texts and the like -- might be too narrow to 
adequately capture the full scope of the practice of dance performing.  
In conclusion, in practice dance performing is not just interpretive. 
Some of dance performing practice is not pre-planned, is not conceptually 
understood, and is better characterized as the trained and expressive output 
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of a dancer who moves in the particular embodied, creative and agentive way 
that includes customary additions to and alterations of a dance as it comes 
into being and as it is performed. If one thinks that this can and does affect 
the understanding, experience, and appreciation the audience has in ways 
that typically contribute to rather than detract from a dance performance 
then the idea that these sorts of departures from structure make the 
performance “bad” is inapt. Indeed, dancers are in an important number of 
cases valued for a creative, expressive contribution to what the dance 
performance is. Dancers are certainly sometimes executors, and sometimes 
interpreters, but they also often do produce something that is individual, 
new, trained, and skilled, and in this sense, they are artists.  
 
Aili Bresnahan 
University of Dayton 
                                                        
 
1 Thanks go to Anthony Cross, Renee Conroy, Anna Pakes, and Andrew 
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